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A growing number of industrial chemicals have been identified as re-
productive hazards that may present a significantly greater risk to the de-
veloping fetus than to the sperm or egg. Many employers have responded
to this risk by excluding fertile women from the toxic workplace through
so-called "fetal protection policies." Because these policies have cost the
jobs of women only, the two circuit courts to face the issue have consid-
ered the problem exclusively in the context of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In their effort to find a solution, the courts have mis-
construed Title VII to allow current occupational health standards, which
are based on the physical vulnerabilities of men, to dictate the availability
of jobs for women.
The courts' exclusive focus on Title VII guarantees a flawed solution to
the problem of fetal hazards. Employers' discriminatory response has
called attention to a real toxic substances problem. Because fetal protec-
tion policies mark the point where sex discrimination and toxic dangers
intersect, the correct legal response can come only through examining the
legislation Congress has enacted in response to both problems: Title VII
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Title VII requires that
the opportunity to get a job and to be protected on that job be extended
equally to men and women. TSCA requires that the level of workplace
protection from toxins be high enough to protect employees' offspring, as
well as employees themselves, from unreasonable risks. Read together, the
two statutes protect women by prohibiting policies that exclude them from
the workplace, while providing an effective means of limiting the produc-
tion and use of fetal toxins and stimulating the development of safer
substances.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
In today's industrial workplace, chemical substances frequently present
serious health risks to employees and their future offspring.1 Toxins can
1. Several commentators have discussed the issue of reproductive hazards in the workplace. See
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interfere with the reproductive process by causing gene mutations in
sperm and egg (called germ cell mutagenesis) or abnormal fetal2 develop-
ment (called teratogenesis).3 By excluding women from the workplace in
response to these risks, employers have split the problem in two: where
before there was only a health problem, there is now a discrimination
problem as well.
A. Workplace Discrimination
Focusing on the evidence of toxins' teratogenic effects, employers in in-
creasing numbers4 are instituting "fetal protection policies" which exclude
fertile women' from the industrial workplace or condition continued em-
ployment on sterilization.' It has been estimated that these protective poli-
Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Em-
ployment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981); DOUBLE EXPOSURE (W.
Chavkin ed. 1984); Ashford & Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace: A
Prescription for Prevention, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523 (1983); Finley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women
from the Hazardous Workplace: The Latest Example of Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a
Legitimate, Neutral Response to an Emerging Social Problem?, 1985 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 16-1;
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Preg-
nancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV. 63 (1980); How-
ard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Employment Rights of Women,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1981); Nothstein & Ayres, Sex-based Considerations of Differentiation in
the Workplace: Exploring the Biomedical Interface between OSHA and Title VII, 26 VILs. L. REV.
239 (1981); Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
1113 (1977); Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface
of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 J.L. REF. 237 (1979); Comment, Fetal Protection Pro-
grams under Title VII-Rebutting the Procreation Presumption, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 755 (1985).
2. For the sake of simplicity, this Note will use the words "fetus" and "fetal" to refer to all stages
of prenatal development.
3. This abnormal development can be caused by an interference with the genetic material of the
fetus or by a more direct interference with fetal cellular processes. See infra notes 13-16 and accom-
panying text.
4. Williams, supra note 1, at 642.
5. Fertile women are typically defined as all women of childbearing age who cannot prove that
they are sterile. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Any woman
age 5 through 63 is assumed to be fertile."). Because fetuses are especially vulnerable to teratogenic
harm in the first weeks after conception when women may not know they are pregnant, see Mottet &
Ferm, The Congenital Teratogenicity and Perinatal Toxicity of Metals, in REPRODUCTIVE AND DE-
VELOPMENTAL TOXICITY OF METALS 95, 95 (T. Clarkson, G. Nordberg & P. Sager eds. 1983),
employers justify excluding all women, not just pregnant women, from the toxic workplace. Williams,
supra note 1, at 697.
6. Lead, mercury, benzene, vinyl chloride and carbon monoxide are a few of the many substances
for which employers have instituted these policies. Williams, supra note 1, at 647-48. As part of their
exclusionary policies, some employers offer to cover sterilization costs for any woman who wishes to
keep her job in a newly restricted area. In 1978, in response to such a policy, five women working at
the American Cyanamid Company underwent surgical sterilization in order to keep their jobs. Two
others who refused the operation were demoted to janitors. Shortly after the policy was implemented,
the company's Inorganic Pigments Department, at the time the only department affected by the pol-
icy, was closed down and the female employees without seniority lost their jobs. American Civil Lib-
erties Union Foundation, Women's Rights Project Annual Report 1983 at 1-3 (discussing Christman
v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 80-0024 (N.D. W. Va. filed Jan. 30, 1980) (settled)); Scott, Keeping
Women in Their Place: Exclusionary Policies and Reproduction, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra note
1, at 180.
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cies currently exclude women from at least 100,000 jobs.' The growing
popularity of the policies could bar women from millions more.$
Many of these policies appear to be nothing but pretexts for denying
women high-paying, traditionally male, blue collar jobs. The same em-
ployers who justify excluding women out of concern for their reproductive
health frequently disregard evidence that the toxins also threaten male
reproductive functions9 or that waste from these toxins threatens the
health of nearby residents and their future offspring. 10 In addition, fetal
protection policies are conspicuously absent in the female-dominated
workplaces-the "pink collar ghettos"-where women are also exposed to
reproductive hazards."'
B. Non-Pretextual Fetal Danger
Although evidence suggests that many-perhaps most-current policies
are pretextual, it does not indicate that the entire problem of fetal hazards
is fictional, dreamed up by employers looking for a new way to shut
women out of jobs. Information about the reproductive risks posed by tox-
ins is limited, 2 but our current knowledge of the physiology of the male
and female reproductive systems suggests that some toxins may pose a
greater threat to reproductive health through maternal exposure than
through paternal exposure.
Teratogens can interfere with fetal development in two ways. First,
they can alter the genetic blueprint of the fetus so that, in essence, the
fetus grows according to the wrong plan.'" A teratogen that causes genetic
damage in the developing fetus might cause that same damage in the de-
veloping sperm (or egg) and could therefore threaten reproductive health
7. Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1979, at A6, col. 4.
8. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Department of Labor, Interpretive
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514, 7514
(proposed Feb. 1, 1980) ("Preliminary evidence indicates that as many as 20 million jobs may involve
exposure in the workplace to alleged reproductive hazards."), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981).
9. See Williams, supra note 1, at 656-60.
10. See Lytle, Bitter Trade Leaves Worker Sterile, (discussing American Cyanamid Company's
fetal protection policy, described supra note 6); Lytle, American Cyanamid Co.: Good Neighbor or
Hazard? (discussing environmental risks posed by American Cyanamid's presence in community and
allegations of company's illegal disposal of toxins); New Haven Reg., Dec. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 1. The
two articles appeared together.
11. See Williams, supra note 1, at 649. For example, nurses exposed to anesthetic gases, anti-
cancer drugs, ionizing radiation, and even particular detergents are more likely to suffer spontaneous
abortions or bear children with birth defects. Coleman & Dickinson, The Risks of Healing: The
Hazards of the Nursing Profession, in DouBLE ExPosuRE, supra note 1, at 45-47, 49-50. Simi-
larly, secretaries who spend most of their working day in front of video display terminals (VDTs)
have complained that their exposure to ionizing and non-ionizing radiation increases the risk of prob-
lem pregnancies. Henifin, The Particular Problems of Video Display Terminals, in DouBLE ExPo-
SURE, supra note 1, at 72.
12. Williams, supra note 1, at 661.
13. Mottet & Ferm, supra note 5, at 96.
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through either parent.14 Alternatively, even if the genetic blueprint re-
mains correct, a teratogen can poison the growing fetus throughout the
pregnancy by interfering with its ability to respond to genetic instruc-
tions. 5 Unlike genetic damage, this developmental poisoning threatens
only the fetus itself, and not the sperm or egg. This second teratogenic
mechanism therefore threatens reproductive health through the mother
alone.
1 6
Even those teratogens shown to affect the reproductive process through
both sexes may have a significantly greater effect on women." A woman's
period of vulnerability is much greater than a man's, 8 and the most vul-
nerable segment of the reproductive process-when the fetus is undergo-
ing rapid cell proliferation and differentiation-occurs within her. 9 In
addition, women may absorb some toxins faster than men,"0 and may ab-
sorb and circulate them in greatest quantities when pregnant. 2
14. See id. The sperm and egg, joined at conception, supply all the genetic material for the off-
spring. Any damage to the genetic material of the sperm or egg through mutagenesis will therefore
threaten the reproductive process.
15. Id. at 96. These "epigenetic" injuries can lead to abnormal cell death, an alteration of cell
proliferation, differentiation, biosynthesis and migration, and an interference with intercellular
processes. Id. at 97.
16. See Susanne, Mutagenesis as a Health Problem, in MUTAGENicrrI, CARCINOGENICITY, AND
TERATOGENICiTY OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTrrANTS 1, 2 (M. Kirsch-Volders ed. 1984) (many agents
cause teratogenesis through mechanisms not related to mechanisms of mutagenesis and carcinogene-
sis). Some scientists have speculated that an exposed male may be able to transmit teratogenic sub-
stances to a pregnant female during intercourse. See Hatch, Mother, Father, Worker: Men and
Women and the Reproductive Risks of Work, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra note 1, at 169; Williams,
supra note 1, at 657. Although such speculation suggests that a man's exposure may continue to
threaten reproductive health after conception, that threat of indirect maternal exposure is likely to be
far less significant than the threat posed by the pregnant woman's direct and continuous exposure on
the job.
17. See, e.g., Hricko, Social Policy Considerations of Occupational Health Standards: The Ex-
ample of Lead and Reproductive Effects, 7 PREVENTIVE MED. 394, 402 (1978) (citing study showing
that anesthetic gases adversely affected male and female reproductive health, but effect on women
more statistically significant).
18. Because a woman is born with her life supply of eggs and carries the developing fetus until its
birth, she exposes her potential offspring to the environment for many years, whereas a man, who
continually produces new sperm, exposes a potential offspring to the environment for only a brief
period. Clarkson et. al., An Overview of the Reproductive and Developmental Toxicity of Metals, in
REPRODUCTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL TOXICITY OF METALS, supra note 5, at 5.
19. Id. at 95; cf. Haas & Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspring from Parental Occupational Expo-
sures, 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 607, 608 (1979) (transplacental carcinogens especially threatening
to fetus, which is "inherently more vulnerable because of the high rate of cell division, high proportion
of undifferentiated cells and immaturity of immunosurveillance mechanisms").
20. See R. ZXELHUis, A. STIJREL, M. VERBERK & M. VAN DE POEL-BoT, HEALTH RISKS TO
FEMALE WORKERS IN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO CHEMICAL AGENTS 2 (1984).
21. The physiological changes a pregnant woman undergoes, which allow her absorption, restora-
tion and distribution processes to operate at peak efficiency, draw excessive concentrations of toxins
into her blood supply. Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work, in DOUBLE
EXPOSURE, supra note 1, at 198-99. This blood supply nourishes her fetus. In some instances, a
toxin is distributed "preferentially" to the fetus. Clarkson et. al., supra note 18, at 6, 24 (citing
evidence showing that concentration of methylmercury is higher in fetal than maternal blood after
exposure).
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Most important, a reproductive error that occurs during fetal develop-
ment is far more likely to lead to tragic results than an error that occurs
during spermatogenesis. In both sexes, the reproductive process protects
itself by detecting and rejecting abnormalities. In a man, this means that
abnormal cells are far less likely to develop into mature sperm22 or reach
the egg to fertilize it.23 These protective responses are not themselves trau.
matic events. In a pregnant woman, on the other hand, both the protective
event, miscarriage, and the failure of that event to occur, which leads to
live birth with defects, are tragedies.2
II. THE RESPONSE OF THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: FITTING FETAL
PROTECTION POLICIES WITHIN TITLE VII
Employers' facially discriminatory policies and the apparent pretextual
nature of many of these policies have focused the attention of courts, liti-
gants and commentators on Title VII. In their efforts to attack pretextual
policies, they have decided, without sufficient consideration, that fetal pro-
tection policies based on real differences between men and women's vul-
nerability are legal under Title VII.2 5 This conclusion does violence to
anti-discrimination doctrine and provides inadequate health" protection for
women in both male-dominated and pink collar workplaces.
A. Professor Williams' Analysis
Professor Wendy Williams, the foremost academic critic of fetal protec-
tion policies, has focused on the pretextual or stereotyping nature of many
of these policies.2" Williams suggests that employers' improper reliance
22. Manson & Simons, Influence of Environmental Agents on Male Reproductive Failure, in V.
HUNT, WORK AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN 155, 157 (1979).
23. Id. at 175. Even where the interference with sperm production is severe enough to prevent all
sperm from fertilizing the egg, the constant replenishment of a man's sperm supply makes it less
likely that the injury will be permanent. See Hatch, supra note 16, at 166 (evidence suggests that
agents' effect on sperm development is only associated with recent exposure and "once exposure is
removed . . . healthy sperm regenerate"); Manson & Simons, supra note 22, at 156 (most agents
studied "cause reversible effects on male reproductive function").
24. This is not to say that damage to sperm could not lead to either of these tragedies. However,
the body's selective mechanisms, discussed above, significantly reduce the chance that these events will
occur. Even if a genetic defect in the sperm does lead to fetal death, that death is likely to occur early
in the pregnancy, because the defect will be present in every fetal cell. Manson & Simons, supra note
22, at 155.
25. Those few commentators who suggest that these policies violate Title VII as it is now applied
advocate a change in the law to allow for the policies. See Furnish, supra note 1, at 65, 102-03,
115-18 (advocating statutory amendment of Title VII to permit employers to exclude potential child
bearers from workplace where scientific evidence shows special reproductive threat through women
and where no less discriminatory alternative available); Howard, supra note 1, at 813-14, 839 (advo-
cating change in judicial interpretation of Title VII business necessity defense to allow for exclusion-
ary policies where no less discriminatory alternatives available).
26. See Williams, supra note 1, at 653-65.
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upon inadequate and sex-biased scientific research and their disregard for
any research identifying male reproductive risks can account for employ-
ers' conclusions that their female employees are at special risk.17 Perhaps
because she considers remote the chance that employers will develop non-
pretextual policies based on sound scientific evidence, Williams concludes
that such unbiased policies should be permissible under Title VII 8
Although Williams is right to criticize the dearth of scientific data on
the reproductive risks posed by toxins, she is on shaky ground in assuming
that more complete and objective research and a fairer evaluation of all
available data will show that men and women face comparable reproduc-
tive risks.2 9 Any advancement in knowledge that shows that women are
indeed at greater risk will undermine Williams' argument. Because supe-
rior data may emphasize rather than obscure sex-based distinctions in vul-
nerability, an analysis of fetal protection policies must look beyond a con-
sideration of pretext and carefully consider the legal and political
significance of the more objectively supportable claims employers will in-
evitably make.30
B. The Courts' Analysis
To date, only two circuit courts have considered the legality of fetal
protection policies under Title VII. In Wright v. Olin Corporation,31 the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision upholding the Olin
Corporation's exclusionary policy and articulated a standard of evaluation
for the district court to apply on remand. The Fourth Circuit's opinion
suggested that a proper application of the standard to the facts of the case
would lead to a finding that Olin's policy violated Title VII.32 In Hayes v.
27. Id. at 660-61.
28. Id. at 667 (in "extremely rare" event that substance found harmful to fetus solely through
maternal exposure, employer could "apply its facially-neutral reproductive policy only to the affected
workers-who happen to be women").
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
30. In assessing the validity of an employer's policy, a court generally considers the information
that was available to the employer at the time of implementation. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines
Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (employer need only show that all information
available to it at time of decision reasonably required challenged practice), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965
(1981); cf. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984) (employer need
only show that body of opinion identifying significant risk is so great "that an informed employer
could not responsibly fail to act on the assumption that this opinion might be the accurate one")
(quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982)).
31. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
32. See id. at 1187 ("evidence adduced on trial would not suffice to support a finding of business
necessity as we think it should be applied"). In fact, the district court heard only Olin's defense on
remand, because there was no representative available for the plaintiff class. Although the district
court decided that Olin's policy complied with the Fourth Circuit's standard without even hearing
plaintiff's opposing argument, 585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D.N.C. 1984), the Fourth Circuit vacated that
decision, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Shelby Memorial Hospital,33 the Eleventh Circuit applied its own stan-
dard of evaluation and found the hospital's policy in violation of Title
VII.3 4 An application of the two standards indicated that the particular
policies before the courts unlawfully discriminated against women. Both
standards, however, provide that an exclusionary policy that prevents ex-
posure to substances that pose a scientifically recognized significant repro-
ductive risk to pregnant women alone, and for which there is no less dis-
criminatory alternative, could be defended as a business necessity. 35 In
keeping with Williams' analysis, both courts would cut short the protec-
tion guaranteed to women under Title VII by endorsing an interpretation
of the statute that allows male-based occupational health standards to de-
termine the scope and safety of job opportunities for women. And like
Williams, both courts have intimated to employers that a more exhaustive
consideration of information and more carefully crafted language will
make their exclusionary policies legally acceptable. 6
In their effort to solve a difficult industrial problem exclusively within
the framework of Title VII-the only statute litigants put before
them-the Olin and Hayes courts misconstrued the terms and principles
of the law. In reaching the conclusion that Title VII allows for scientifi-
cally justified' fetal protection policies, the courts made two interpretive
errors. First, they employed disparate impact analysis when the law man-
dates the more rigorous disparate treatment analysis. Second, within the
inappropriate disparate impact framework, the courts improperly ex-
panded the business necessity defense allowed the employer.
1. Disparate Treatment Through Fetal Protection Policies
In interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court has developed two
frameworks of analysis: the disparate treatment framework and the dispa-
rate impact framework.37 The courts employ disparate treatment analysis
33. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
34. In Hayes, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the discharge of a pregnant
x-ray technician violated Title VII. While the facts of Hayes differ significantly from the facts consid-
ered in Olin and this Note, the Hayes court attempted to improve upon the analysis in Olin and
"present a clearer picture of the overall framework" under which all fetal protection policies should
be analyzed. Id. at 1546 n.2. This Note confines its scope to the consideration of fetal protection
policies that deny employment to all fertile women.
35. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190-92; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1554.
36. A well-crafted policy would, of course, serve the interests of the bad faith employer hiding
discriminatory intent as well as the good faith employer genuinely concerned with the health of its
employees' offspring.
37. In the interest of brevity, I confine my explanation of the doctrine to the bare bones. As a
result, many details that are essential to a full understanding of the law, but not to my analysis here,
will not be discussed. For a more complete discussion of the doctrine, see, for example, Furnish, A
Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.O.L. REv. 419 (1982).
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whenever they determine that the employer intended to make a sex-based
distinction with its policy, whether the distinction is expressed or con-
cealed. 8 Within the disparate treatment framework, employers have only
one narrow defense: Unless sex is shown to be a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) 39-a qualification directly related to applicants'
ability to perform the job-the sex-based distinction violates Title VII."4
In contrast, the courts employ disparate impact analysis only when they
determine that an employer did not intend to make a sex-based distinc-
tion, but promulgated a neutral policy which had significantly different
effects on the two sexes.41 The proper employer defense to a claim of
disparate impact is that the policy is dictated by business necessity.
42 Al-
though the requirements of the business necessity defense have not been
well defined, it is clearly easier for an employer to defend a policy as a
business necessity than as a BFOQ.
43
As defined in Title VII, sex discrimination includes discrimination "on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."' 44 This
definition, added by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)45 in 1978,
makes clear the Title VII requirement that a policy that by its terms ex-
cludes potential child-bearers from the workforce is facially discriminatory
on the basis of sex.4 ' As such, a fetal protection policy must be analyzed
38. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
40. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1977) (although BFOQ defense is "ex-
tremely narrow," defense properly claimed for job of correctional counselor where "woman's relative
ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary. . . could be directly
reduced by her womanhood"); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per
curiam) (only if family responsibilities were "demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a
woman than a man" could sex arguably be defended as BFOQ); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (to claim BFOQ successfully, employer must show factual
basis for believing all or most women would be unable to perform job).
41. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The business necessity defense is a
judicial creation, first articulated in Griggs.
43. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1, at 672; see also infra text accompanying notes 58-61 (dis-
cussing lower courts' articulation of defense).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
45. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). For a
discussion of the events leading up to the amendment's enactment, see Furnish, supra note 1, at
74-83, and Williams, supra note 1, at 673-78.
46. Although the legislative history of the PDA indicates that Congress was primarily concerned
with requiring employers to treat pregnancy like medical disabilities when developing payment and
leave policies and did not directly confront the problems associated with fetal hazards, see Furnish,
supra note 1, at 77-82, Congress clearly intended to include discrimination on the basis of child-
bearing capacity within the amended definition, see H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6-7,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4753, 4754-55. In any event, there was no
suggestion in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court decision overruled by the PDA, that
discrimination based on the capacity to bear children would not be sex discrimination. 429 U.S. 125
(1976). The Court based its Gilbert decision on the fact that a pregnancy classification distinguished
some women from other women and all men. Id. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 & n.20 (1974)). Plainly, that cannot be said of a classification based on child-bearing capacity
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not as an instance of disparate impact, but as disparate treatment, which
can be defended only by showing that sex is a BFOQ.47 In other words,
unless an employer can show that the presence of fetal hazards prevents
female employees from performing their jobs effectively,48 a court must
find a policy that excludes all"9 women and only women in violation of
Title VII.
Both the Olin and Hayes courts, however, failed to follow the dictates
of Title VII and the PDA. The Olin court conceded that the claim was
"arguably one of 'overt' discrimination,""0 but then disregarded well-
established Title VII doctrine and concluded that defendants were not
limited to the BFOQ defense.51 Although the Hayes opinion was more
attentive to doctrinal requirements, it, too, bent the doctrine by concluding
that the facially discriminatory nature of a fetal protection policy was
merely a presumption that could be rebutted by a showing that "although
[it] applie[d] only to women, the policy [was] neutral in the sense that it
effectively and equally protect[ed] the offspring of all employees." 5 Echo-
which distinguishes virtually all women from all men. See id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("it is
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male").
47. The PDA provides that women affected by these conditions "shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Nothing in the legislative history of the PDA suggests
that "ability or inability to work" was intended to evalute anything more than an employee's ability to
perform the job. Job-created health and safety risks affecting child-bearing or fetal health do not affect
job performance as it is contemplated by the Act.
48. See Furnish, supra note 1, at 94 (BFOQ inadequate defense for exclusionary policies unless
shown that women's concern for fetal health interferes with their ability to perform job).
49. The fact that fetal protection policies allow sterile women to work does not undercut this
characterization. The number of verifiably sterile women is small. See R. EDWARDS, CONCEpTrON IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE 7 (1980). Although it can be argued that many women could choose to be
sterilized in order to qualify for employment, it is an argument that loses sight of the issue: To make
job offers to women contingent on sterilization is to exclude all women from the normal hiring
process.
50. 697 F.2d at 1186 n.21.
51. Id. The court dismissed concern over how to characterize the policy as "mere semantic quib-
bling," id. at 1186, and concluded:
While the loose equation-overt discrimination/only b.f.o.q. defense-is therefore properly de-
scriptive of a paradigmatic litigation pattern, it is not an accurate statement of any inherent
constraints in Title VII doctrine.
In this case, where the defendant-employer has not attempted to present a classic b.f.o.q.
defense, it may not properly be forced to do so.
Id. at 1186 n.21. The Olin court's blatant disregard for doctrinal requirements is troubling not only
because it permits the wrong result in cases similar to Olin, but also, more generally, because it
threatens to undermine the rigorous protection Title VII provides against all instances of overt dis-
crimination in employment. See Furnish, supra note 1, at 114 (expressing concern that courts' will-
ingness to shift focus of Title VII defenses away from "'ability to perform the job"' in context of fetal
protection policies would create "possibility for abuse of the title VII defenses in other contexts").
52. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548. According to Hayes, an employer rebuts a prima facie case of dispa-
rate treatment when it can point to a body of scientific opinion that believes that a particular work-
place hazard presents a significant risk of reproductive harm to women and not to men. Id. In the case
before it, however, the Hayes court found that because the employer failed to make the proper show-
ing that Hayes' exposure to ionizing radiation presented a significant risk of harm, the employer's
policy was facially discriminatory. Id. at 1550-51.
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ing Williams, 53 Hayes suggested that a neutral, non-discriminatory goal
renders the discriminatory policy itself neutral. But a policy does not be-
come neutral simply because it has a neutral goal when the means of
achieving that goal are explicitly discriminatory."
2. The Limits of the Business Necessity Defense
The faulty analysis in Hayes and the lack of analysis in Olin led both
courts to consider fetal protection policies within the disparate impact
framework. This interpretive error allowed employers to raise the busi-
ness necessity defense rather than the narrower BFOQ defense. The
courts compounded their error by inappropriately expanding the scope of
the business necessity defense.
Although the Supreme Court has made no clear pronouncement on the
scope of the business necessity defense, it indicated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.55 that an employment qualification inspired by business neces-
sity, like a bona fide occupational qualification, must be tied to applicants'
ability to perform the job. 56 In subsequent cases the Court has echoed that
requirement.
57
The lower courts, which have attempted to develop more specific crite-
ria for an acceptable business necessity defense, have focused on the need
to operate a business safely and efficiently.58 Although the definition of
53. The Hayes court frequently referred to Williams' article and even stated, "[w]e agree with the
Williams approach." 726 F.2d at 1549.
54. In City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Supreme Court
considered the validity of a pension plan that required women to make larger contributions than men
because mortality tables indicated that women generally live longer than men. Although the em-
ployer's goal -to see that each employee paid his or her own way to the extent that could be deter-
mined in advance-was clearly neutral, the Court had no trouble recognizing that the policy repre-
sented facial discrimination against women, because it "'treated]. . .a person in a manner which but
for the person's sex would be different."' Id. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)).
Similarly, a fetal protection policy which, by its terms, excludes all fertile women because they are
capable of bearing children is not neutral in the language of discrimination law.
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
57. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14 (business necessity standard requires that "a discrimina-
tory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance"); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.13 (1979) (statistical showing of disparate
impact is rebutted by demonstration that policy is "job related").
58. The Fourth Circuit's test, articulated in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., has served as a model
for other courts: "The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that
the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367,
1376 (9th Cir. 1979); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928-29 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir.
1973); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973). By emphasizing safety and making the somewhat subtle shift from
performance to operation, this lower court definition dearly expands upon the Supreme Court's char-
Fetal Hazards in the Workplace
business necessity notably does not include the need to control expenses,u°
it does embrace an employer's concern for the safety of fellow workers and
customers.60 The courts make clear, however, that an employer's concern
for the health and safety of the woman it wishes to exclude cannot justify
the exclusion as a business necessity.61 An applicant's right to equal op-
portunity in employment cannot be compromised by an employer who
wishes to protect her from harm.
The Olin and Hayes courts' analysis of fetal protection policies as in-
stances of disparate impact forced them to consider whether an employer's
efforts to protect the safety of employees' potential fetuses could be de-
fended as a business necessity. In the case most nearly on point, Burwell
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,62 the Fourth Circuit refused to consider the
employer's concern for the health of an employee or her fetus a valid
business necessity. 63 Burwell involved Eastern's decision to ground preg-
nant stewardesses in part because it claimed that continuing in-flight
work might harm the fetus. The court rejected Eastern's business neces-
sity defense based on this claim and suggested that only the employee her-
self could properly make judgments for her fetus:
Eastern's contention that an element of business necessity is its
consideration for the safety of the pregnant flight attendant and her
unborn child is not persuasive. If this personal compassion can be
attributed to corporate policy it is commendable, but in the area of
civil rights, personal risk decisions not affecting business operations
are best left to individuals who are the targets of discrimination.4
acterization of business necessity in Griggs. Nevertheless, the Robinson test, which does not indicate
the scope of the "safe operation of a business," presumably satisfies the job-relatedness standard out-
lined in Griggs. The Supreme Court has not embraced the Robinson standard. The Court's closest
equivalent makes explicit the link between job qualification and job performance. See Dothard, 433
U.S. at 332 n.14.
59. The Supreme Court declared in City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart
that "neither Congress nor the courts have recognized [a cost-justification] defense under Title VII."
435 U.S. at 716-17. Lower courts have applied the prohibition within the disparate impact frame-
work as well. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 366 & n.11 (8th Cir. 1973);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at 799 n.8, 800; Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
60. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d at 371, 373.
61. Id.; Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d at 236; see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at
335 (citing lower court decisions to support assertion that it is "purpose of Title VII to allow the
individual woman to make [risk decisions] for herself").
62. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
63. Id. at 371. Because Eastern's policy was instituted before the PDA's enactment, the court in
Burwell analyzed it within the disparate impact framework.
64. Id. Unlike the Olin and Hayes courts, the Burwell court refused to limit its condemnation of
protective exclusionary policies to those that could not be objectively justified. Regardless of how pure
or "commendable" the employer's motives, Burwell concluded, excluding women from the workplace
denies them their civil right to equal opportunity in employment.
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Although neither the Olin nor the Hayes court addressed Burwell's asser-
tion that fetal protection was outside the province of the employer,
65 both
courts conceded that they had to exceed the established definition of busi-
ness necessity in order to allow for any fetal protection policies.
6
The Olin court "adapted"' 7 the business necessity defense to include
fetal protection by drawing an analogy between the fetus and the business
invitee or licensee.6 Title VII, the Court reasoned, should not "deprive
employers of the right" to protect all "visitors" legitimately on the busi-
ness premises, especially those "visitors" related to employees.
69 In draw-
ing its analogy, the court addressed neither the uniqueness of the relation-
ship between mother and fetus, 0 nor the logical inconsistency of using the
analogy to justify preventing not-yet-existent fetuses from ever becoming
"legitimate visitors."71 The court was content to attribute its liberal use of
analogy and the consequent "adaptation" of the business necessity defense
to society's general interest "in having [business] enterprises operated in
ways protective of the health of workers and their families, consumers and
environmental neighbors.
'72
The Hayes court, in explicitly rejecting the employer's claim that a de-
65. This omission is particularly noteworthy in Olin, both because Burwell has precedential value
for the Olin court, and because the Olin court cites to Burwell several times to support other asser-
tions of law. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1184 (theories applied to Title VII litigation not intended to be rigid);
id. at 1186 (disparate impact theory should be applied to fetal protection policies); id. at 1190 ("objec-
tive proof required to establish business necessity"); id. at 1191 (discriminatory protective policy
should be "judged by contemporaneously available information"); id. (dual relevance of rebutting
prima facie defense against allegation of Title VII violation). Olin even cites to the pertinent passage,
but only to support the assertion that employers cannot discriminate against women to protect the
health of the women themselves. Id. at 1188.
The Hayes court obscures the message of Burwell in another way: It cites to Burwell's damaging
language to support the contradictory conclusion that "federal courts. . .[which] have considered the
issue of employer fetal protection plans have recognized the need for a narrowly circumscribed busi-
ness necessity defense." 726 F.2d at 1552.
66. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1187; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 & n.15; see also Furnish, supra note 1, at
100-01 (business necessity defense must be dangerously "watered down" to include employers' moral
concern with health of employees' potential offspring).
67. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1187.
68. Id. at 1189.
69. Id.
70. The Supreme Court has recognized a woman's unique right to make fundamental decisions
about the destiny of her fetus, free from interference by the state or other interested parties. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing special nature of relationship between mother and fetus by
extending right of privacy to woman's choice whether to carry fetus to term); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (finding statute's spousal and parental consent requirements
unconstitutional constraints upon woman's right to choose abortion). The business invitce is neither as
dependent upon the one who "invites" her to the workplace nor as insulated from other actors as is
the fetus.
71. When the employer excludes women from the workplace, it precludes the potential legal rela-
tionships between the fetus and itself. Fetuses cannot fill the role of invitees if they are disinvited from
the employer's premises before they exist.
72. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26. The Olin court cites to a number of general regulatory statutes
to demonstrate that our "national laws" support these laudable goals. Id.
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sire to avoid tort liability constituted a valid business necessity,73 empha-
sized that it, too, was willing to expand the business necessity defense for
reasons of policy alone.7 A concern for the health of employees' offspring,
the Hayes court contended, is a valid business necessity despite the fact
that this concern is entirely unrelated to job performance. 5 Refusing to
adopt the Fourth Circuit's analogy between fetus and invitee, 76 and una-
ble to find a doctrinal justification of its own, the Hayes court justified its
expansion of the defense with the bald assertion that "we simply recognize
fetal protection as a legitimate area of employer concern to which the bus-
iness necessity defense extends." 7
Both the Olin and Hayes courts suggested that Title VII affords the
plaintiff an opportunity to rebut an employer's claim of business necessity
by showing that the employer could have achieved the same necessary re-
sult in a less discriminatory manner.7 8 For the workplace permeated with
toxins, however, a court, limited by its own inexpertise79 and by its con-
cern for feasibility,80 effectiveness81 and industrial autonomy,82 is unlikely
73. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 n.15. ("our extension of the business necessity defense beyond a strict
relationship to job performance is based on a higher public policy than simply protecting employers
from lawsuits"); cf. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26 (because consideration of societal interest is enough
to justify business necessity defense for fetal protection policy, court need not consider whether avoid-
ing tort liability, alone, could establish business necessity defense). Although the Hayes court found
that the employer policy before the court failed the initial neutrality test, it justified its consideration
of the business necessity defense as an attempt to be "fair" to the employer. 726 F.2d at 1552.
74. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 n.15.
75. Id. at 1552 & n.15.
76. Id. at 1552 n.14 ("We believe it unnecessary to place the fetus into a legal classification
developed for an entirely different aspect of the law, and therefore decline to endorse Olin's approach
of equating a fetus with a business invitee or licensee.").
77. Id.
78. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1191; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553; see also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d at 798 (showing that no "acceptable, less discriminatory policies or practices" available required
to establish business necessity). The use of less-discriminatory-alternative analysis to determine the
strength of a business necessity claim, rather than to discover a pretext for intentional discrimination,
raises doctrinal questions beyond the scope of this Note. For two divergent treatments of the issue,
compare Furnish, supra note 37, at 423-24 (consideration of less discriminatory alternatives could
appropriately be used to determine whether policy is business necessity) with Note, Rebutting the
Griggs Prima Facie Case under Title VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives,
1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 181, 207-10 (consideration of less discriminatory alternatives is only appropri-
ate to show policy was pretext for purposeful discrimination). See also Williams, supra note 1, at
693-94, 699 n.329 (Supreme Court has not yet clearly established appropriate application of less-
discriminatory-alternatives analysis).
79. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
80. See Olin, 697 F.2d at 1191 n.29 (whether less discriminatory alternatives are economically
and technologically feasible is "factual/legal issue to be addressed by the district court").
81. Workplace modifications may be of only limited effectiveness. Protective clothing and respira-
tors often provide inadequate protection. See Rothstein, Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to
OSHA Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards as an Example, 12 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 627, 685
(1985); Williams, supra note 1, at 701 n.339. Leave policies cannot guard against fetal damage that
occurs before an employee knows she is pregnant unless she wishes to leave the job for the entire
period during which she is trying to conceive. Even such an extended leave cannot protect a woman
from toxins stored in her bone or fat for years. See Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 1, at 256; Roth-
stein, supra, at 687. Work rotation programs are only effective when other jobs at a comparable level
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to identify less discriminatory alternatives it feels comfortable imposing on
the industry. Where the only effective means of protecting women from
reproductive damage may be severely limiting or banning the use of a
substance, the courts, unqualified to make that judgment, will refuse to
recognize the existence of less discriminatory alternatives. In short, a find-
ing of business necessity by the Olin or Hayes standards will generally
end the inquiry and excuse the exclusionary policy under Title VII.
Unaided by precedent, the Olin and Hayes courts turned to policy to
justify overstepping the established bounds of the business necessity doc-
trine.83 But the policy the courts embraced is fundamentally inconsistent
with the terms and principles of Title VII. To suggest that running a safe
and efficient business may necessitate hiring only men is tantamount to
suggesting that safe need only mean safe for men. With the extension of
employment opportunities to a new class of citizens must come an adjust-
ment of workplace conditions to meet the basic health and safety needs of
that class."
Working conditions, especially where toxins are prevalent, cannot be
perfected overnight. Nevertheless, the system of incentives created by the
courts will strongly influence the quality of those conditions in years to
come. In allowing employers to exclude women from the teratogenic
workplace, the Olin and Hayes courts give the chemical industry the
wrong incentive. They send the message that as long as toxins are only
teratogenic, they are marketable. In permitting the perpetuation of a
male-based health and safety standard, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
are "'freez[ingl' the status quo," contrary to the Supreme Court's admo-
of skill are toxin-free.
82. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress
they should not attempt it.").
83. Commentators who advocate the application of the business necessity defense to fetal protec-
tion policies also suggest that such a move is justified by public policy considerations. See, e.g., Wil-
liams, supra note 1, at 695 (interpretation of business necessity defense that protects effective "neu-
tral" fetal protection policies is "consistent with . . . public health policy").
84. At the turn of the century, after striking down protective legislation that applied to men and
women, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the courts justified upholding similar legislation
that applied only to women by pointing to women's special maternal role. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 421-23 (1908) (limiting the number of hours women can work is appropriate because "physical
well-being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength
and vigor of the race"). In the name of fetal health, this protective legislation deprived women of jobs
and men of protection. To the extent that workplace threats to maternal health were real and not the
product of stereotypes, the legislative response eliminated employers' incentives to diminish those
threats. Title VII invalidated this sex-based legislation. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444
F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) ("state law limitations upon female labor run contrary to the general
objectives of Title VII"). See generally Kessler-Harris, Protection for Women: Trade Unions and
Labor Laws, in DOUBLE ExposuRE, supra note 1, at 139-54 (discussing relationship between labor
movement and women's movement).
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nition in Griggs."5 If, instead, the courts refuse employers the option of
excluding women from the workplace, employers will have to improve
working conditions for all employees in order to avoid tort liability and to
satisfy their concern for the health of their employees' offspring."8
III. THE SOLUTION AVAILABLE UNDER TSCA
Although a proper application of Title VII would improve upon cur-
rent incentives for the development of safer substances, discrimination law
alone cannot solve the problem of fetal hazards. The threat many indus-
trial workplaces pose for the developing fetus is a serious pollution prob-
lem that requires an immediate, comprehensive response. This pollution
problem has been recast as a discrimination problem only because em-
ployers have responded by discriminating against women.
As workplace pollutants, fetal hazards are more appropriately con-
trolled through regulation than through judicial action. Courts, confined
to the particular facts of a case and lacking administrative powers and
scientific expertise,"" provide inadequate protection against environmental
hazards.88 They are particularly unqualified to regulate an industry's pol-
lution problem in the course of adjudicating other claims. Although the
Olin and Hayes courts did not claim to take on the responsibility of regu-
lating fetal hazards, their interpretations of Title VII established a stan-
dard by which individual employers' regulations will be judged. In
countenancing employers' ad hoc response to the problem of fetal hazards,
the courts have sanctioned a lawless form of self-help. They would have
85. 401 U.S. at 430.
86. To the extent that society's special concern for the "weaker sex" has led it to identify general
problems of working conditions, a protectionist impulse serves the health and safety interests of all
employees. An employer's recognition of a teratogenic risk may help to identify carcinogenic and
mutagenic risks as well. See Williams, supra note 1, at 659 (teratogenesis, mutagenesis and carcino-
genesis could all result from same action of toxic substance). Of course, the value of that impulse
cannot justify an employer's illegal response.
87. Courts readily concede this lack of expertise. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
598 F.2d 62, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
88. See D. CURRIE, POLLUTION, CASES AND MATERIALS 80-81 (1975). Professor Currie ex-
plains the inadequacy:
In the first place, court action is entirely too fortuitous an event to serve as the basis for a
reliable pollution-control program. Litigation is fortuitous in its timing, in the type of case that
may arise, and in the quality of presentation. . . An effective program of pollution control
requires that the control agency possess considerable expertise in the area of regulation and
that it have the capacity to plan ahead for anticipated problems. Courts manifestly are not
endowed with either of these features. Further, to serve as an effective force in pollution con-
trol, the agency responsible must have the ability to administer a flexible program that involves
remaining in contact with the party regulated to see that the agency's orders are complied
with. ...
Finally, and perhaps of most importance, the adversary system under which court proceed-
ings are conducted does not adequately assure representation of the public interest in pollution
control.
Id. at 80.
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done better to consider the entire scope of applicable legislation before
deciding to adjust their interpretation of Title VII to allow for employers'
exclusionary policies.
A. The Unique Appropriateness of TSCA
The regulatory legislation that preceded the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA),89 including the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA),90 allows the chemical industry
9" to use its choice of substances
and merely provides for a doctoring of the end result-the regulation of
exposure levels through filtering and monitoring equipment, protective
clothing and warning labels.92 Such responses cannot always provide ade-
quate protection, and they create little incentive for the chemical industry
to alter its menu. In addition, once unlimited use is allowed, the actual
concentration released into the environment at each individual plant is dif-
ficult to monitor,93 and a failure to control that concentration properly can
be viewed more as an innocent mistake than as a defiance of the law.
The failure of existing regulatory legislation to protect workers from
89. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982)).
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). Because OSHA is generally assumed to be the regulatory
statute most applicable to the problem of reproductive hazards in the workplace, see, e.g., Furnish,
supra note 1, at 67-74; Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 1; Rothstein, supra note 81, at 630, 1 will
refer to its provisions as examples throughout my discussion of the comparative merits of TSCA.
OSHA has proved of only limited usefulness in the regulation of toxins in general and reproductive
toxins in particular. See Furnish, supra note 1, at 67-74; cf. Rothstein, supra note 81, at 698 (attrib-
uting current lack of information on reproductive hazards in workplace in part to "historical lack of
interest in the field" at agencies responsible for administering OSHA). The following discussion of
TSCA's relative merits should not, however, be construed as an argument against the use of OSHA in
all circumstances where protection from toxic hazards is needed. TSCA explicitly provides for the
referral of regulatory decisions to other agencies where the EPA "determines, in the Administrator's
discretion, that [an unreasonable] risk may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent by action
taken under [another] Federal Law." 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(1) (emphasis added).
91. This Note will refer to chemical manufacturers, processors, and distributors as "the chemical
industry" and "the industry." Under TSCA, this general reference is especially appropriate because
the Act spreads the responsibility for the safety of chemicals among all businesses that profit from
their use. This Note will also use "employer" and "the chemical industry" interchangeably, because
all employers who use chemicals are subject to the requirements of the Act.
92. See S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4491, 4491-92 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. For example, the remedies an OSHA
standard can require are limited to "labels or other appropriate forms of warning," "protective equip-
ment and control or technological procedures," "monitoring," and "medical examinations." 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(7). In addition, when engineering and work practice controls prove inadequate to reduce
concentrations to the established permissible level, employers are only required to reduce the concen-
tration to the lowest level possible without reducing their use of a toxin. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1018(g)(1) (1985) (implementation requirements for OSHA standard for inorganic arsenic).
The Third Circuit's recognition of a narrow exception to the general policy emphasizes how unpre-
pared OSHA is to regulate toxins directly: "We do not question that there are industrial activities
involving hazards so great and of such little social utility that . . . their total prohibition is proper if
there is no technologically feasible method of eliminating the operational hazard." AFL-CIO v. Bren-
nan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975). Not surprisingly, no such activity has yet been identified.
93. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of OSHA,
49 PuB. INTEREsT 39, 51 (1977).
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the "cancer, mutations and birth defects" caused by chemical hazards
prompted Congress to enact TSCA.94 In sharp contrast to its predecessors,
TSCA requires the EPA to begin its regulatory response by asking the
question: Should the toxin be used at all? Only after the EPA finds that
an absolute ban on a substance is inappropriate can it consider lesser reg-
ulatory responses ranging from a specific ban on particular uses or con-
centrations to the more traditional requirements of protective equipment
and warnings. 5 TSCA's ability to regulate substances directly by limiting
or preventing their use creates a strong incentive for the chemical industry
to develop safer products.
The EPA's authority to ban chemicals under TSCA is buttressed by
strict reporting and testing requirements imposed on the industry. For all
newly developed chemicals, TSCA mandates a premarket review to deter-
mine whether any regulatory action is necessary. 6 For chemicals already
on the market, TSCA requires the EPA to make a regulatory judgment
within 180 days of receiving information that suggests that a toxin poses a
significant risk.97 Information is to be provided regularly by the industry
itself"' and may be supplemented by others who are concerned that toxins
are properly regulated.99 Where the EPA deems existing information in-
adequate, it can require the industry to sponsor additional tests for muta-
genic, teratogenic and other hazardous effects. 100
Perhaps most important, TSCA grants citizens the ultimate policing
94. SENATE REPORT, supra note 92, at 1-5, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4491-95.
In the words of the SENATE REPORT, TSCA was enacted to "close a number of major regulatory
gaps." Id. at 5, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4495.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(0.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 2607. TSCA requires chemical manufacturers and processors to maintain records
of the allegations made by employees and consumers that health problems they suffer were caused by
those chemicals. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c). These companies are also required to submit to the EPA a list
of all health and safety studies known to them which were conducted on the chemicals they manufac-
ture or process, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d), and to report information they obtain that suggests that any of
these chemicals poses a substantial risk, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e).
99. TSCA allows any person to petition the Administration to issue a regulation and "set forth
the facts" which establish the need for the regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a), (b)(1).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2603. No other statute shifts testing costs to industry. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 92, at 2, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4492-93. OSHA, in contrast, limits the
information upon which the Secretary of Labor can base a decision to regulate to the "best available
evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). As discussed above, the evidence available on the effects of most chemi-
cals on reproductive health is inconclusive, and though OSHA established the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to collect scientific data and recommend standards to theSecretary, the Act provides the Institute with no guidance about research priorities. 29 U.S.C. § 671.
The funds NIOSH allocates to the study of occupational reproductive hazards are clearly insufficient.
For example, in 1982, NIOSH allocated a total of only $300,000 to fund four of the 100 proposals to
study reproductive hazards submitted in response to NIOSH's solicitation. Over the next four years,NIOSH projected it would spend only one million dollars on research about reproductive hazards. See
Sdentific Data Insufficient for OSHA to Issue Generic Rules, Vance Testifies, 12 O.S.H. REP.
(BNA) 204, 204 (1982).
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authority: Any citizen or activist group can enforce TSCA by suing mem-
bers of the industry or the EPA.10 1 Because TSCA establishes a compre-
hensive system of required actions, a court can review the adequacy of
agency activity without inappropriately intruding upon discretionary au-
thority. TSCA's explicit guarantee of a private right of action preserves
the value of the statute in periods of regulatory sluggishness.
TSCA provides the strong response the enormity of the problem de-
mands, but it does not call for irresponsible solutions. It requires the EPA
to weigh social and economic costs against benefits before imposing regu-
lations102 and provides for the mitigation and sharing of the costs the EPA
decides to impose.10
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2619, 2620(b)(4)(A). If citizens can show, by a preponderance of the evidence
at a trial de novo, that the EPA should have issued a regulation, the court must order the EPA 
to take
the action requested. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4)(B). In contrast, OSHA affords employees and other
interested citizens little opportunity to challenge the Secretary of Labor's failure to promulgate 
a
standard. Rothstein, supra note 81, at 656-57. At the same time, OSHA explicitly provides employers
with an opportunity to take the Secretary to court if they feel the Secretary's regulatory action will
affect them adversely and is not "supported by substantial evidence in the record." 29 U.S.C. § 
655(0.
If the Secretary chooses not to adopt a specific standard for a particular toxin, employees are only
protected by an amorphous general duty clause. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). In a companion case to
Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., discussed supra note 6, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Work-
ers Union alleged that American Cyanamid's sterilization option violated OSHA's general duty
clause. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The D.C. Circuit, however, refused to accept the sterilization requirement as a "recognized hazard"
from which an employer had a duty to protect its employees. Id. at 449. Whatever protection the
clause does provide is removed once OSHA promulgates any standard, even one too low to 
protect
against recognized reproductive hazards. See Rothstein, supra note 81, at 648.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3), (c). The costs to industry will vary depending on whether the sub-
stance being considered is new or already in use. The cost of testing a new product is relatively 
small
when weighed against the possible benefit of discovering a serious health hazard. Short-term tests,
which are becoming increasingly popular and sophisticated, can be used to screen for possible hazards.
See Mottet & Ferm, supra note 5, at 110 (discussing increasing use of inexpensive in vitro tests for
teratogens). Where a suspect toxin is identified, the chemical industry can either attempt to refute 
the
initial conclusion with slower, more expensive tests, or abandon the product to cut its losses. See Toxic
Substances Control Act: Hearings on S. 776 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1975) (statement of Director of Office of Program
Analysis of General Accounting Office). Although industry bears the cost of developing a substance
that the EPA ultimately finds unmarketable, it can mitigate its costs by screening possible products 
in
the early stages of development and shifting research efforts toward the development of chemicals 
that
are more likely to be safe. Id. at 86.
The testing and regulation of chemical substances already in use are likely to be more costly. 
If
necessary, the chemical industry will probably be willing to invest in more expensive, reliable 
tests in
an attempt to prove that a marketed substance does not present a substantial risk. Id. at 84. 
Although
the cost of eliminating a substance with a unique and vital function may outweigh the benefit 
to
human health of its elimination, the EPA should carefully scrutinize claims of uniqueness. Popular
products are frequently unique until there is a need to develop a replacement.
Although the difference in costs is significant, the gap between the regulation of pre-market 
chemi-
cals and chemicals currently in use is not unbridgeable. A newly developed substance that is a com-
pound based on an already marketed substance, such as lead, must still be tested and approved. 
If the
EPA bans many new lead compounds, the chemical industry will devote resources to developing
replacements. As new substances are developed, the lead compounds in use today may become increas-
ingly replaceable.
103. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c)(3)(A). TSCA also provides for an adjustment in or exemption
from reporting requirements for small businesses. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a); see also SENATE REPORT,
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B. Applying TSCA to Fetal Hazards in the Workplace
A comprehensive statute designed to deal exclusively with toxins,
TSCA provides the proper framework in which to regulate fetal hazards.
Because the EPA and the courts are just beginning to enforce TSCA, it
can readily be applied to a problem to which attention has only recently
been drawn by employers' exclusionary policies.
TSCA requires chemical producers, processors and distributors to re-
port to the EPA all information that suggests that a substance presents a
substantial risk.104 Any employer who concludes on the basis of scientific
evidence that its workplace is not safe for the developing fetus should be
considered in possession of such information and thus required to report it
immediately to the EPA. If the employer fails to report, the EPA should
exercise its authority to penalize the employer for its omission.105
The EPA itself is required to take regulatory action within 180 days 06
of receiving information that suggests a substance poses a significant risk
of harm "from cancer, gene mutations or birth defects."1 07 The statutory
threshold for triggering EPA action is low: The information need merely
indicate that "there may be a reasonable basis"' 08 to conclude that a toxin
is hazardous. Therefore, any information which could justify a non-
pretextual exclusionary policy should trigger a regulatory response.
Should the EPA act too slowly or refuse to act at all upon information it
receives, the Administrator, like the employer who fails to report, can be
brought to court. TSCA's private right of action gives citizens the power
to compel the EPA and the chemical industry to respond to fetal hazards
as the statute requires.1 09
As already noted, TSCA provides the EPA with a list of possible regu-
latory responses which range from a published finding of no unreasonable
supra note 92, at 11-12, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4501-02 (resporise to claim that
TSCA would hurt small businLss). To help employers comply with the Act, TSCA also established an
assistance office which provides "technical and other nonfinancial assistance." 15 U.S.C. § 2625(d).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e). "Any person who manufactures, processes or distributes in commerce
as [sic] chemical substance or mixture and who obtains information which reasonably supports theconclusion that such substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment shall immediately inform the [EPA] Administrator of such information unless such person
has actual knowledge that the Administrator has been adequately informed of such information." Id.
105. The EPA has the authority to assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 each day for violations
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a). In addition, an employer who willfully fails to comply is criminally
liable for up to $25,000 per day and/or one year in prison. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
106. TSCA allows the EPA an extension of no more than 90 days if, having made a good faith
effort, it is unable to act within the first 180 days. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(0(2).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 2619. The resources for such litigation can be pooled by environmental, health,
agd women's organizations who can then, in the name of their constituents, police agency and indus-
try action more effectively.
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risk11° to the limitation or prevention of production.
111 What TSCA does
not include on the list is as significant as what it does. Despite the fact
that the statute is aimed at reproductive problems that may affect one sex
to a greater degree, TSCA's itemization of regulatory responses does not
provide for any gender-specific distinctions in treatment. Lacking such
provisions, TSCA cannot be read to modify Title VII, and any remedies
that the EPA imposes under TSCA's authority must comply with Title
VII's mandate against the exclusion of women from jobs.
1 12 The EPA
cannot, by issuing exclusionary regulations, authorize action that would
otherwise violate Title VII.
Of course, the EPA may make a judgment that society values a particu-
lar toxin so highly that it is willing to sacrifice the health or life of the
threatened number of employees' offspring for its continued use. This sort
of cost-benefit evaluation is not new; only the inclusion of risks to women
in the evaluation, as required by Title VII, is new. Because of women's
special reproductive vulnerabilities, including them in the evaluation may
tip the scales toward a decision to regulate. A consideration of teratogenic
effects may lead society to conclude that the costs of use outweigh the
benefits, but such a conclusion is no more inevitable than when risks to
men alone are considered.
IV. FETAL HAZARDS IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD: THE
INTERACTION OF TSCA AND TORT LAW
Although TSCA provides for time limits,
1 3 a priority list,1 1 4 and
premarket scrutiny"1 5 to hurry the EPA into action, the Act requires the
development of new regulatory machinery, which takes time. In the in-
terim, employees will continue to be exposed to dangerous quantities of
hazardous chemicals, and the prospect of leaving their fetuses unprotected
during this period is troubling. Courts have expressed a willingness to
tolerate employers' exclusionary policies simply because they provide a
short-term solution. If courts continue to be tolerant, there will be no
110. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f)(2).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
112. Conversely, in the absence of a court finding that fetal protection policies violate Title VII,
the EPA can enforce TSCA by requiring an employer to promulgate a scientifically based discrimina-
tory policy. In 1979, acting under the assumption that discriminatory policies were permissible under
Title VII, the EPA enforced the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(1982), by prohibiting the use of pesticides containing Mirex by fertile women. See Women Prohibited
From Using Pesticide: EPA Defends Decision as "Justfiable," 8 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (1979).
No similarly sex-biased regulations have been promulgated under TSCA, but unless the courts find
non-pretextual fetal protection policies in violation of Title VII, such regulations may arise.
113. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f)(2).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
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long-term solution. Allowing a business necessity defense to facially dis-
criminatory policies encourages the chemical industry to continue using
and developing teratogens, and signals to the EPA that it, too, can take
short cuts and fulfill its regulatory obligation by excluding women from
the workforce. While the EPA develops its regulatory machinery, agency
action should be supplemented by traditional tort law protection, not dis-
criminatory exclusion."1
This interaction between tort law and TSCA is appropriate, because
TSCA represents an expansion rather than a refutation of the common
law doctrine. That doctrine requires those whose conduct poses a risk that
society deems unreasonable117 to compensate the victims of their negli-
gence with monetary damages.' 18 TSCA draws upon this common law
language of cost-benefit analysis, identifying "unreasonable risks" " and
requiring those responsible for such risks to pay for their imposition.
Where tort law requires those who impose unreasonable risks to compen-
sate victims for the actual damage they cause, 20 TSCA blocks the imposi-
tion of unreasonable risks and forces the imposer to pay for a less risky
replacement. Turning the general principles of common law into a specific
statute, Congress indicated that it was not satisfied with a remedy that
only protected victims from the economic cost associated with cancer, mu-
tations and birth defects, but not from the injuries themselves. While that
more rigorous regulatory structure is being put into place, however, tort
law's retrospective assessment of risks will continue to provide some pro-
tection against employers' unreasonable use of toxins. 2 '
Tort law and TSCA should also interact in another way: A finding of
116. The few courts to consider the relationship between tort law and TSCA have recognized
their compatibility. See, e.g., Chappell v. SCA Servs., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1087, 1100 (C.D. Ill. 1982)
("it appears to the court that the TSCA does not preempt state common law nuisance actions for
damages"); State v. Monarch Chems., Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 343, 346, 443 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969 (Sup. Ct.
1981), affld, 90 A.D.2d 907, 456 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1982) (TSCA's preemption provisions, which recog-
nize states' continuing authority to regulate toxins, extend to states' power to impose tort liability).
117. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PsossER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Ptossast & KEETON].
118. Id. § 1, at 1-4.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
120. PsossER & KEETON, supra note 117, § 4, at 20.
121. The principles embodied in Title VII require that women be allowed to decide for them-
selves whether they will work in a toxic environment. A well-informed prospective mother may choose
not to work to avoid a risk or to work because she feels the risk is slight or because she is willing to
postpone her pregnancy. In making her decision, she is not likely to be influenced by liability consid-
erations. Therefore, a tort system that required her to bear the cost of a bad decision would not
effectively deter the unreasonable risk. No woman considering the prospect of bearing a severely de-
formed child is less troubled by that prospect because she knows the child will be cheap.
Employers, on the other hand, often make decisions on the basis of tort liability. Prior to the
issuance of an EPA regulation that could prevent a hazard from causing an injury, responsibility for
prenatal damage should rest with the employer who exposed its employees to an unreasonable risk.
The factfinder would reach its decision by conducting a cost-benefit analysis similar to, but less so-
phisticated than the analysis the EPA would conduct under TSCA.
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tort liability, as information that indicates that a chemical substance
presents a significant risk of harm, should trigger immediate action under
TSCA.122 If the factfinder determined that the employer had knowledge
of the unreasonable risk which it kept secret, the employer would be sub-
ject to criminal sanctions under TSCA in addition to its liability in tort.
23
Should the EPA choose to issue a regulation, employees in the future will
be better protected from damage to their offspring as well as from the cost
of raising a deformed child. On the other hand, should the EPA choose to
publish a finding of "no unreasonable risk" in the Federal Register,
124
that public notice will support an employer's claim in future tort actions
that it did not act unreasonably by exposing its employees to the toxin.
125
As TSCA is put into effect in response to private pressure or government
support, the law surrounding the use of toxic substances will become more
certain, more specific, and more effective at preventing injury than it
could ever be at common law.
CONCLUSION
To allow employers to escape liability under TSCA and at common
law by excluding women from the toxic workplace is to embrace a dis-
criminatory status quo: the workplace that is only safe for men. Title VII
rejects a status quo that deprives a protected class of its right to equal
opportunity in employment.
TSCA guarantees women a protection against reproductive hazards
that goes well beyond the protection the courts have attempted to provide
with their strained interpretation of Title VII. The Act ensures that all
women-not just women in the male-dominated workforce-can be pro-
tected from teratogenic toxins. And instead of leaving protection in the
hands of employers, it empowers women to protect themselves by suing
their employers or the EPA. A consideration of the grave problem of fetal
hazards within the framework of TSCA will direct the chemical industry
toward a long-term solution far safer and more fair than any available
today.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(0(2). Environmental and health organizations, as part of their policing
efforts, should immediately inform the EPA of such decisions and the information upon which they
were based.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(0(2).
125. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 117, § 36, at 233 ("compliance with a statutory stan-
dard is evidence of due care").
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